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Digital information is pervasive in today’s society.
Many potential sources of digital information:
• Desktops; Laptops
• Tablets; Cell Phones
• Internet-Based Services
• Cars
My research makes internal, technical data usable by non-technologists
• Law Enforcement — Document a conspiracy (stock fraud; murder-for-hire; Silk Road)
• DOD — Identify members of a terrorist organization.
• Ordinary people — Recover deleted files.




Snapchat promised users that expired images could not be 
viewed unless “saved.”
5
Snapchat promised users that expired images could not be 
viewed unless “saved.”
5
OMG! — Expired images not actually deleted.
They were just hidden from view.
6
5/10/13 Recover deleted Snapchats? Decipher Forensics finds sexting app's privacy problem.
www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/05/09/recover_deleted_snapchats_decipher_forensics_finds_sexting_app_s_privacy.html 1/2
By  Will  Oremus  |  Posted  Thursday,  May  9,  2013,  at  3:56  PM
Snapchat's  users  shouldn't  be  shocked  to  find  that
their  images  can  be  recovered  even  after  they  "self-­
destruct"—but  they  will  be  anyway.
Sylvie  Bouchard/Shutterstock.com
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THE  CITIZEN'S  GUIDE  TO  THE  FUTURE
OMG,  "Deleted"  Snapchat  Sexts  Can  Actually  Be
Recovered
The  premise  of  Snapchat  is  simple:  Send  a  photo  or
short  video  to  a  friend,  and  it  will  self-­destruct  after
10  seconds.  That  way,  it  won’t  wind  up  on  the
Internet  and  ruin  anyone’s  reputation,  friendships,
or  career.
Needless  to  say,  that  has  made  it  a  wildly  popular
choice  for  sexting.  But  Snapchat’s  appeal  goes  far
beyond  that.  In  an  age  in  which  “privacy”  and
“technology”  have  become  almost  antonymous,  it
has  been  billed  as  the  anti-­Facebook—a
communications  tool  that  deletes  your  data  rather
than  preserving,  analyzing,  and  trading  on  it.  In
short,  it’s  supposed  to  make  messaging  fun  again.
But  the  app’s  security  has  never  been  ironclad.  As
the  media  have  repeatedly  warned  parents,  and
parents  in  turn  warned  their  kids,  message
recipients  can  still  save  a  compromising  image  by
taking  a  quick  screenshot.  But  Snapchat  tries  to
mitigate  the  risk  somewhat  by  automatically
notifying  the  sender  when  that  happens.  If
someone  screenshots  you,  it’s  a  virtual  slap  in  the
face.  If  they  don’t,  you  can  assume  you’re  in  the
clear.
Except  that  apparently  you  can’t.  KSL-­TV  in  Utah
reports  that  an  Orem-­based  firm  called  Decipher
Forensics  has  figured  out  a  way  to  recover  supposedly  deleted  images  from  the  recipient’s
phone.  The  process  isn’t  simple:  24-­year-­old  Decipher  forensics  examiner  Richard  Hickman  told
the  network  that  it  takes  him  about  six  hours,  on  average,  to  image  the  phone’s  data.  So  far
he  can  only  do  it  with  Android  devices,  though  he’s  working  on  doing  the  same  for  iOS.  But  his
firm  is  now  offering  to  perform  the  recovery  procedure  for  anyone  who  wants  it,  from  parents
to  lawyers  to  the  police,  for  $300  to  $500.
Snapchat  is  trying  to  brush  off  the  finding.  “We’re  not  really  paying  much  attention  to  it,”
spokeswoman  Mary  Ritti  told  U.S.  News  on  Thursday.  “I  mean,  it’s  forensic  software.”
She  has  a  point.  Forensic  software  can  also  recover  lots  of  other  things  you  thought  you  had
deleted  from  your  phone  or  computer,  provided  the  data  hasn’t  yet  been  overwritten  by  other
files.  The  reason  we  don’t  all  live  in  fear  of  this  happening  is  because  it  requires  someone  to
take  possession  of  your  device,  then  spend  a  bunch  of  time  and  money  combing  through  the
hidden  data.  If  they  can  do  that,  odds  are  you  have  other  security  problems  on  your  hands
besides  the  potential  recovery  of  some  embarrassing  snapshots.
And  for  what  it’s  worth,  Snapchat’s  privacy  policy  explicitly  states  that  there’s  no  guarantee
your  data  will  always  be  deleted.  “Messages,  therefore,  are  sent  at  the  risk  of  the  user,”  it  says.
Still,  Snapchat’s  users  are  unlikely  to  be  mollified  if  it  turns  out  their  nude  selfies  have  been
preserved  for  posterity  after  all.
If  Snapchat’s  young  founders  soon  find  themselves  on  the  wrong  end  of  a  successful  lawsuit,
the  lesson  won’t  be  that  they  failed  at  protecting  their  users’  privacy.  It  will  be  that  it’s
dangerous  to  build  a  business  on  the  illusion  of  privacy  in  the  first  place.
Will  Oremus  is  the  lead  blogger  for
Future  Tense,  reporting  on  emerging
technologies,  tech  policy,  and  digital
culture.  Future  Tense  is  a  project  from
Slate,  the  New  America  Foundation,
and  Arizona  State  University.
1. Creationist  “Science”  Test
Given  to  Fourth  Graders
By  Phil  Plait  |  May  9,  2013
2. Help!  Can  I  Ask  My  College
Kids  Not  to  Come  Home  This
Summer?
By  Emily  Yoffe  |  May  9,  2013
3. Kids  of  Tiger  Moms  Get  Worse
Grades  and  Are  More
Depressed
By  Paul  Tullis  |  May  8,  2013
4. Grandmas  and  their  Amazing
Food  From  Around  the  World
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5. The  Troubling  Viral  Trend  of
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Science  and  Religion  Can
Never  Be  Reconciled.
Stop  Trying—It’s  Bad  for
Science.
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Garmin Nüvi Data Retention
7
Many devices preserve information in non-obvious ways.
8
Many devices preserve information in non-obvious ways.
8
Garmin maps show where you are...
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Maps can also show where you have been.
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The Garmin GPS appears as an external USB storage 
device with directories and files.
22




Is there a privacy leak?
Technical Privacy Auditing (TAP) is a way to find out.
Questions:
• Is there information present that we can’t see?
• Is this information potentially damaging?
Technical Privacy Auditing
1 TARGET  — What are we examining? Why?
2 RESEARCH  — What is the format? Are there available tools?
3 COLLECT  — Obtain exemplars, ideally from multiple instances
4 ANALYZE  — Extract Features; Look for oddities & outliers
5 EXPERIMENT — Show that you understand what is happening
6 REPLICATE  — Ideally on another system
7 REPORT  — Share results in a concise & understandable form
24
The file 24.gpx contains track information in XML format.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no" ?><gpx xmlns="http://www.topografix.com/GPX/1/1" 
xmlns:gpxx="http://www.garmin.com/xmlschemas/GpxExtensions/v3" xmlns:gpxtpx="http://www.garmin.com/xmlschemas/

































(Reformatted for improved readability)
<trkpt lat="38.885058" lon="-77.114068">
       <ele>88.58</ele><time>2013-08-23T14:47:54Z</time>
       <gpxtpx:speed>5.49</gpxtpx:speed>
       <gpxtpx:course>180.71</gpxtpx:course>
</trkpt>
<trkpt lat="38.885008" lon="-77.114062">
       <ele>88.10</ele><time>2013-08-23T14:47:55Z</time>
       <gpxtpx:speed>5.49</gpxtpx:speed>
       <gpxtpx:course>177.88</gpxtpx:course>
</trkpt>
Accuracy of 0.000001º lat is ≈ 40,000 km ÷ 360 x .000001 ≈ 0.1 m 
                    ≈ 10cm
GPS accuracy is 7.8 meters w/ 95% confidence level
• http://www.gps.gov/systems/gps/performance/accuracy/
26






The file 24.gpx has 766,553 ÷ 266 ≈ 2,900 tracking points in it.
27
A simple program gets stats from the GPX files:
import xml.sax, os, glob
class SpeedReader(xml.sax.ContentHandler):
    def __init__(self):
        xml.sax.ContentHandler.__init__(self)
        self.cdata = ""
        self.speeds = []
    def startElement(self,name,attrs):
        self.inElement = name
        self.cdata     = ""
    def characters(self,content):
        self.cdata += content
    def endElement(self,name):
        if name=="gpxtpx:speed":
            self.speeds.append(float(self.cdata))
def get_gpx_speeds(fn):
    sr = SpeedReader()
    try:
        xml.sax.parse(open(fn,"rb"),sr)
    except xml.sax._exceptions.SAXParseException:
        pass
    print(fn,min(sr.speeds),max(sr.speeds),len(sr.speeds))
if __name__=="__main__":
    for fn in glob.glob("*.gpx"):
        get_gpx_speeds(fn)
28
$ python crunch.py
12.gpx 1.37 28.82 4188
13.gpx 1.37 28.82 4015
14.gpx 1.37 30.2 10095
15.gpx 1.37 28.82 3827
16.gpx 1.37 34.31 9830
17.gpx 1.37 34.31 8664
18.gpx 1.37 26.08 3405
19.gpx 1.37 34.31 8082
20.gpx 1.37 32.94 9023
21.gpx 1.37 32.94 11081
22.gpx 1.37 32.94 10880
23.gpx 1.37 32.94 3822
24.gpx 1.37 32.94 3964
25.gpx 1.37 34.31 5045
26.gpx 1.37 34.31 8826
27.gpx 1.37 34.31 8649
28.gpx 1.37 34.31 3907
29.gpx 1.37 28.82 7700
30.gpx 1.37 28.82 3774
31.gpx 1.37 17.84 996
129,773  records
20 files
The Sleuth Kit (TSK) show no deleted files in the 
/GPX/Archive directory.
$ fls -r SLG-GARMAIN.E01  28
d/d 28:! GPX
+ r/r 54419718:! Current.gpx
+ d/d 54419720:! Archive
++ r/r 57598982:! 21.gpx
++ r/r 57598984:! 22.gpx
++ r/r 57598986:! 23.gpx
++ r/r 57598988:! 24.gpx
++ r/r 57598990:! 25.gpx
++ r/r 57598992:! 26.gpx
++ r/r 57598994:! 27.gpx
++ r/r 57598996:! 28.gpx
++ r/r 57598998:! 29.gpx
++ r/r 57599000:! 30.gpx
++ r/r 57599002:! 31.gpx
++ r/r 57599004:! 12.gpx
++ r/r 57599006:! 13.gpx
++ r/r 57599008:! 14.gpx
++ r/r 57599010:! 15.gpx
++ r/r 57599012:! 16.gpx
++ r/r 57599014:! 17.gpx
++ r/r 57599016:! 18.gpx
++ r/r 57599018:! 19.gpx
++ r/r 57599020:! 20.gpx
29
+++++ d/d 23676-144-1:! CrashReports
+++++ r/d * 23442-48-2(realloc):! GoogleUpdateHelper.msi
+++++ r/d * 23442-144-1(realloc):!GoogleUpdateHelper.msi
+++++ r/d * 23439-48-2(realloc):! goopdate.dll
+++++ r/d * 23439-144-1(realloc):!goopdate.dll
+++++ r/d * 23441-48-2(realloc):! GoopdateBho.dll
+++++ r/d * 23441-144-1(realloc):!GoopdateBho.dll
+++++ r/d * 23443-48-2(realloc):! goopdateres_ar.dll
+++++ r/d * 23443-144-5(realloc):!goopdateres_ar.dll
+++++ r/d * 23444-48-2(realloc):! goopdateres_bg.dll
+++++ r/d * 23444-144-1(realloc):!goopdateres_bg.dll
(deleted files on another 
volume)
It’s unclear when the files get rolled over...
... or where the data goes when it is rolled over.
• Archive/5.gpx  — 2013-03-07
• ...
• Archive/12.gpx  — 2013-06-11 – 2013-06-16
• Archive/13.gpx  — 2013-06-17 – 2013-06-21
• Archive/14.gpx  — 2013-06-21 – 2013-07-01
• Current.gpx — 2013-10-01 – 2013-10-11
Current also has waypoints and phone numbers...
<wpt lat="38.861390" lon="-77.056519"><ele>-0.11</ele><name>Costco</name>
  <desc>1200 S Fern St\nArlington, VA 22202</desc>
  <sym>Department Store</sym>
  <extensions>
    <gpxx:WaypointExtension>
     <gpxx:Categories><gpxx:Category>Shopping</gpxx:Category>
                      </gpxx:Categories>
     <gpxx:Address><gpxx:StreetAddress>1200 S Fern St
                   </gpxx:StreetAddress>
     <gpxx:City>Arlington</gpxx:City><gpxx:State>VA</gpxx:State>
     <gpxx:PostalCode>22202</gpxx:PostalCode></gpxx:Address>
     <gpxx:PhoneNumber>1 7034132324</gpxx:PhoneNumber>
    </gpxx:WaypointExtension>











bulk_extractor is a stream forensics program.
It finds and extracts “features” from bulk data.
Output is a directory containing:
• feature files; histograms; carved objects
• Mostly in UTF-8; some XML
• Can be bundled into a ZIP file and process with bulk_extractor_reader.py
31









report.xml — log file
telephone.txt — list of phone numbers with context
telephone_histogram.txt — histogram of phone numbers
vcard/ — directory of VCARDs
...
A hex dump shows GPX fragments on sector boundaries.
2510fe0: d0f0 f0d0 f0f0 d0f0 f0d0 f0f0 d0f0 f0d0  ................
2510ff0: f0f0 d0f0 f0d0 f0f0 d0f0 f0d0 f0f0 d0f0  ................
2511000: 6f69 6e74 4578 7465 6e73 696f 6e3e 3c67  ointExtension><g
2511010: 7078 7470 783a 7370 6565 643e 3238 2e38  pxtpx:speed>28.8
2511020: 323c 2f67 7078 7470 783a 7370 6565 643e  2</gpxtpx:speed>
2511030: 3c67 7078 7470 783a 636f 7572 7365 3e32  <gpxtpx:course>2
2511040: 3234 2e34 373c 2f67 7078 7470 783a 636f  24.47</gpxtpx:co
2511050: 7572 7365 3e3c 2f67 7078 7470 783a 5472  urse></gpxtpx:Tr
2511060: 6163 6b50 6f69 6e74 4578 7465 6e73 696f  ackPointExtensio
2511070: 6e3e 3c2f 6578 7465 6e73 696f 6e73 3e3c  n></extensions><
2511080: 2f74 726b 7074 3e3c 7472 6b70 7420 6c61  /trkpt><trkpt la
2511090: 743d 2233 392e 3936 3538 3637 2220 6c6f  t="39.965867" lo
25110a0: 6e3d 222d 3734 2e39 3132 3837 3622 3e3c  n="-74.912876"><
25110b0: 656c 653e 3235 2e31 333c 2f65 6c65 3e3c  ele>25.13</ele><
25110c0: 7469 6d65 3e32 3031 332d 3038 2d31 3854  time>2013-08-18T
25110d0: 3230 3a32 353a 3038 5a3c 2f74 696d 653e  20:25:08Z</time>
25110e0: 3c65 7874 656e 7369 6f6e 733e 3c67 7078  <extensions><gpx
25110f0: 7470 783a 5472 6163 6b50 6f69 6e74 4578  tpx:TrackPointEx
2511100: 7465 6e73 696f 6e3e 3c67 7078 7470 783a  tension><gpxtpx:
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bulk_extractor has a feature extractor for GPX XML.
$ ls -l | cut -c 30- | grep . | grep -v ' 0 '
   133867 Oct 12 18:15 domain.txt
      728 Oct 12 18:15 domain_histogram.txt
     1359 Oct 12 18:15 email.txt
      434 Oct 12 18:15 email_histogram.txt
 12598874 Oct 12 18:15 gps.txt
   188394 Oct 12 18:15 hex.txt
     3102 Oct 12 18:15 json.txt
    28954 Oct 12 18:15 report.xml
    16791 Oct 12 18:15 telephone.txt
     1309 Oct 12 18:15 telephone_histogram.txt
   225582 Oct 12 18:15 url.txt
     3436 Oct 12 18:15 url_histogram.txt
      552 Oct 12 18:15 url_services.txt
  1306682 Oct 12 18:15 windirs.txt
$ 
$ more gps.txt 




83886185        ,,,,,111.53
83886435        2013-06-29T17:31:34Z,38.886777,-77.144822,99.15,10.98,114.3
83886685        2013-06-29T17:31:50Z,38.886160,-77.143053,100.60,8.24,115.7
83886934        2013-06-29T17:32:02Z,38.885877,-77.142233,99.63,5.49,115.76
83887183        2013-06-29T17:32:04Z,38.885841,-77.142125,99.15,4.12,131.29
83887432        2013-06-29T17:32:05Z,38.885827,-77.142082,99.15,4.12,151.06
83887681        2013-06-29T17:32:06Z,38.885727,-77.142003,98.67,5.49,168.00
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$ cut -f 2 gps.txt |grep 2013 | wc -l
  180589 
Simple string operations on “gps.txt” feature file shows 
range of private data leakage.
34
Allocated Bulk Data Analysis
Date Range Feb 10 - Oct 12 June 24 - Oct 12
# Entries 129,773 180,589
Privacy problems for consumers can benefit law 
enforcement.
George Ford Murder trial.
• Killing of Shyanne Somers, 12, on July 8, 2007
• Convicted on 2009
• Key evidence: GPS tracking data
35
My research focus: better tools and algorithms for triage.
Identification of high-value data.




—Temporal / time sequence?
Correlation — are there copies of the same or similar information?
• Identify previously unknown organizations or networks
• Identify data that is unusual or emerging
Presentation and Integration:
• Make the results understandable.
• Effect organizational change through adoption & integration
36
Like GPS information, email addresses 
are of significant forensic interest.
    Email addresses can be compressed.
    Popular forensic tools do not optimistically
    decompress.
 Our study of 1400 drives found
 thousands of email addresses
 that were only in compressed data.
Today’s tools frequently miss case-critical data.
37
It’s so hard that none of the commercial or open source 
digital forensic will show these email addresses.
13
e327 962d 6450 3d91 c945 3bed 97a6 a4cd  .'.-dP=..E;.....
1f8b 0800 0000 0000 0203 8b88 8c72 48ce  .............rH.
cf2d 48cc abd4 03d2 0a8e 4ece 287c 1757  .-H.......N.(|.W
3714 3e00 b455 c1c5 3000 0000 0000 0000  7.>..U..0.......




This may be a serious problem.









































Email addresses can reveal:
• User(s) of a device
• Associates
• Connections between devices 
Today’s forensic tools implement two 
strategies for extracting email addresses.
1.Text extraction from files
2.Text extraction from bulk data







Email addresses are extracted from document files by 










COM TEXT TEXT  
TEXT TEXT
➼
[bulk data] ➼ RegEx ➼ Email Addresses
Regular expressions can also extract email addresses from 






a097 83a1 ed96 26a6 3c69 3d0f 750a 2399  ......&.<i=.u.#.
a2b5 bea7 692f 5847 a38a dd53 082c add5  ....i/XG...S.,..
5061 b64c 721d 864b 90b6 b55f bb04 735c  Pa.Lr..K..._..s\
9448 6730 5453 df64 813e b603 5795 2242  .Hg0TS.d.>..W."B
e9c8 7454 7322 7cdc b60e 97af 2f64 2728  ..tTs"|...../d'(
3cfb 84bd 2a84 2dfe 50ea 5935 c349 1513  <XYZ@COMPANY.COM
a9e9 e92c a3f8 6e46 0530 8a88 c7a2 5d2b  ...,..nF.0....]+
d89d 77cc fe1e f637 f3f3 d0af 1b47 c09b  ..w....7.....G..
It’s easy to see email addresses in bulk data.
42
a097 83a1 ed96 26a6 3c69 3d0f 750a 2399  ......&.<i=.u.#.
a2b5 bea7 692f 5847 a38a dd53 082c add5  ....i/XG...S.,..
5061 b64c 721d 864b 90b6 b55f bb04 735c  Pa.Lr..K..._..s\
9448 6730 5453 df64 813e b603 5795 2242  .Hg0TS.d.>..W."B
e9c8 7454 7322 7cdc b60e 97af 2f64 2728  ..tTs"|...../d'(
3cfb 84bd 2a84 2dfe 50ea 5935 c349 1513  <XYZ@COMPANY.COM
a9e9 e92c a3f8 6e46 0530 8a88 c7a2 5d2b  ...,..nF.0....]+






Every email address is a sequence of bytes.
A simple email address:
XYZ@company.com
Stored on disk / in memory as 15 bytes:
X  Y  Z  @  c   o   m   p  a   n   y  .  c   o   m
Each byte is 8-bits. Range is 0-255
88 89 90 64 99 111 109 112 97 110 121 46 99 111 109
Normally bytes are displayed in hexadecimal notation:
58 59 5a 40 63  6f  6d  70 61  6e  79 2e 63  6f 6d
This is UNICODE
43
Every email address is a sequence of bytes.
A simple email address:
XYZ@company.com
Stored on disk / in memory as 15 bytes:
X  Y  Z  @  c   o   m   p  a   n   y  .  c   o   m
Each byte is 8-bits. Range is 0-255
88 89 90 64 99 111 109 112 97 110 121 46 99 111 109
Normally bytes are displayed in hexadecimal notation:
58 59 5a 40 63  6f  6d  70 61  6e  79 2e 63  6f 6d
This is UNICODE
43
Byte sequences can be encoded in many ways.
XYZ@company.com
• Unicode: “XYZ@company.com” 
58 59 5a 40 63 6f 6d 70 61 6e 79 2e 63 6f 6d
• Base 16: “58595a40636f6d70616e792e636f6d0a”
3538 3539 3561 3430 3633 3666 3664 3730  58595a40636f6d70
3631 3665 3739 3265 3633 3666 3664 3061  616e792e636f6d0a
• Base 64: “WFlaQGNvbXBhbnkuY29tCg===”
5746 6c61 5147 4e76 6258 4268 626e 6b75  WFlaQGNvbXBhbnku
5932 3974 4367 3d3d 3d0a                 Y29tCg===.
• Compression: echo “XYZ@company.com” | compress | xxd
1f9d 9058 b268 0132 e64d 1b38 61dc e471  ...X.h.2.M.8a..q
51b0 8d02                                Q...
44
Compression works by eliminating repeated sequences:
Computers use compression to save memory:
5859 5a40 636f 6d70 616e 792e 636f 6d20  XYZ@company.com 
4142 4340 636f 6d70 616e 792e 636f 6d20  ABC@company.com 
4445 4640 636f 6d70 616e 792e 636f 6d20  DEF@company.com
Compressed with “gzip:”
1f8b 0800 0000 0000 0203 8b88 8c72 48ce  .............rH.
cf2d 48cc abd4 03d2 0a8e 4ece 287c 1757  .-H.......N.(|.W
3714 3e00 b455 c1c5 3000 0000            7.>..U..0...
Compressed email addresses do not “look” like email addresses!
—Forensic tools must decompress FIRST to identify compressed email addresses.
45
It’s hard to see compressed email address in bulk data.
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a097 83a1 ed96 26a6 3c69 3d0f 750a 2399  ......&.<i=.u.#.
a2b5 bea7 692f 5847 a38a dd53 082c add5  ....i/XG...S.,..
5061 b64c 721d 864b 90b6 b55f bb04 735c  Pa.Lr..K..._..s\
9448 6730 5453 df64 813e b603 5795 2242  .Hg0TS.d.>..W."B
e9c8 7454 7322 7cdc b60e 97af 2f64 2728  ..tTs"|...../d'(
3cfb 84bd 2a84 2dfe 50ea 5935 c349 1513  <XYZ@COMPANY.COM
a9e9 e92c a3f8 6e46 0530 8a88 c7a2 5d2b  ...,..nF.0....]+




e327 962d 6450 3d91 c945 3bed 97a6 a4cd  .'.-dP=..E;.....
1f8b 0800 0000 0000 0203 8b88 8c72 48ce  .............rH.
cf2d 48cc abd4 03d2 0a8e 4ece 287c 1757  .-H.......N.(|.W
3714 3e00 b455 c1c5 3000 0000 0000 0000  7.>..U..0.......
0a8e 4ece 287c 1757 3714 3e00 a175 10ed  ..N.(|.W7.>..u..
Mother.JPG
It’s hard to see compressed email address in bulk data.
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a097 83a1 ed96 26a6 3c69 3d0f 750a 2399  ......&.<i=.u.#.
a2b5 bea7 692f 5847 a38a dd53 082c add5  ....i/XG...S.,..
5061 b64c 721d 864b 90b6 b55f bb04 735c  Pa.Lr..K..._..s\
9448 6730 5453 df64 813e b603 5795 2242  .Hg0TS.d.>..W."B
e9c8 7454 7322 7cdc b60e 97af 2f64 2728  ..tTs"|...../d'(
3cfb 84bd 2a84 2dfe 50ea 5935 c349 1513  <XYZ@COMPANY.COM
a9e9 e92c a3f8 6e46 0530 8a88 c7a2 5d2b  ...,..nF.0....]+




e327 962d 6450 3d91 c945 3bed 97a6 a4cd  .'.-dP=..E;.....
1f8b 0800 0000 0000 0203 8b88 8c72 48ce  .............rH.
cf2d 48cc abd4 03d2 0a8e 4ece 287c 1757  .-H.......N.(|.W
3714 3e00 b455 c1c5 3000 0000 0000 0000  7.>..U..0.......





Existing commercial digital forensic tools ignore 
compressed email addresses in bulk data.
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e327 962d 6450 3d91 c945 3bed 97a6 a4cd  .'.-dP=..E;.....
1f8b 0800 0000 0000 0203 8b88 8c72 48ce  .............rH.
cf2d 48cc abd4 03d2 0a8e 4ece 287c 1757  .-H.......N.(|.W
3714 3e00 b455 c1c5 3000 0000 0000 0000  7.>..U..0.......




This is a serious problem.
How many encoded features 
are conventional tools missing?





































Some may be in both files and in non-files.




































































There are four different conditions for an email address on 
the media.
Condition #4 is invisible

























We devised an experiment to determine the size of 
condition #4 for a specific drive.






























































































bulk_extractor is an experimental email extraction tool.
“Digital media triage with bulk data analysis and bulk_extractor,” 
Simson L. Garfinkel, Computers and Security 32 (2013) 56-72






“Feature files” contain the extracted email addresses.
Plain text features have numeric offsets:  
392175418








392175418    WindowsXP@gn.microsoft.com   Name=WindowsXP@gn.microsoft.com\015\012
...
3772517888-GZIP-28322  user@company.com  onterey-<nobr>user@company.com</nobr>
...





























Post-processing with identify_files.py reveals file names
Offset:  392175418  
Feature: WindowsXP@gn.microsoft.com
Context:!\012[User]\015\012Name=WindowsXP@gn.microsoft.com
         \015\012Password=B@ji0
Filename:WINDOWS/system32/oobe/migx25a.dun 
MD5:     2b00042f7481c7b056c4b410d28f33cf      








bulk_extractor 1.4 recognizes a wide variety of features and 
encoding types:
Feature types:
• Domain Names; Email addresses; URLs, CCNs
• Search terms; Facebook IDs; JSON data
• KML files; EXIF data
• VCARDs
• word search output
• PCAP files; Ethernet Addresses; TCP/IP Connections; etc.
• ELF & PE headers; Windows Prefetch files
Encoding Types:
• ZIP; GZIP; RAR; Windows Hibernation
• BASE16, BASE64
66
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff       476 Jul  7 23:50 aes_keys.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff         0 Jul  7 23:48 alerts.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff      2743 Jul  7 23:59 ccn.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff       454 Jul  8 00:03 ccn_histogram.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff         0 Jul  7 23:48 ccn_track2.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff         0 Jul  8 00:03 ccn_track2_histogram.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff  23369167 Jul  8 00:03 domain.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff    185266 Jul  8 00:03 domain_histogram.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff         0 Jul  7 23:48 elf.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff   1719842 Jul  8 00:03 email.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff     35073 Jul  8 00:03 email_histogram.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff     23961 Jul  8 00:00 ether.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff       337 Jul  8 00:03 ether_histogram.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff  11188830 Jul  8 00:03 exif.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff         0 Jul  7 23:48 find.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff      1112 Jul  8 00:01 gps.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff         0 Jul  7 23:48 hex.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff     95835 Jul  8 00:03 ip.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff     11603 Jul  8 00:03 ip_histogram.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff   2025702 Jul  8 00:03 json.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff         0 Jul  7 23:48 kml.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff    194991 Jul  8 00:03 packets.pcap
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff     21343 Jul  8 00:03 report.xml
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff   3782598 Jul  8 00:03 rfc822.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff    213746 Jul  8 00:03 tcp.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff     61255 Jul  8 00:03 tcp_histogram.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff     59469 Jul  8 00:03 telephone.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff      6612 Jul  8 00:03 telephone_histogram.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff  67205326 Jul  8 00:03 url.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff         0 Jul  8 00:03 url_facebook-id.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff   5706665 Jul  8 00:03 url_histogram.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff         0 Jul  8 00:03 url_microsoft-live.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff      8504 Jul  8 00:03 url_searches.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff    151673 Jul  8 00:03 url_services.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff         0 Jul  7 23:48 vcard.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff  18549729 Jul  8 00:03 windirs.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff  29051041 Jul  8 00:03 winpe.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff   1984759 Jul  8 00:03 winprefetch.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff  34128889 Jul  8 00:03 zip.txt
This drive contains a GZIP stream in a Windows Hibernation File.
• JSON object downloaded from Facebook by compressed HTTP
• In RAM, written to HIBER on disk when the system went into sleep.
Some drives have a lot of compressed data
67
...
…6464-HIBER-49691-GZIP-1526   groups-noreply@linkedin.com   3d\134"groups-noreply@linkedin.com
…6464-HIBER-49691-GZIP-2018   m*****************@gmail.com  3d\134"m*****************@gmail.co
…6464-HIBER-49691-GZIP-2128   sur*******1@gmail.com         3d\134"sur*******1@gmail.com\134"\
…6464-HIBER-49691-GZIP-2625   *******.consultancy@gmail.com 3d\134"*******.consultancy@gmail.c
…6464-HIBER-49691-GZIP-2736   sur*******1@gmail.com         3d\134"sur*******1@gmail.com\134"\
…6464-HIBER-49691-GZIP-3186   san****@***********.com       \134" "san****@***********.com\134"\134u
…6464-HIBER-49691-GZIP-3685   Careers@******bank.com        3d\134"Careers@******bank.com\134"
…6464-HIBER-49691-GZIP-4124   par****@team******.com        3d\134"par****@team******.com\134"
…6464-HIBER-49691-GZIP-4149   u003epar****@team******.com   \134u003epar****@team******.com\13
…6464-HIBER-49691-GZIP-4607   d****.*****@gmail.com         3d\134"d****.*****@gmail.com\134"\
…6464-HIBER-49691-GZIP-4631   u003ed****.*****@gmail.com    \134u003ed****.*****@gmail.com\134
…6464-HIBER-49691-GZIP-5114   raj******@bsnl.in             3d\134"raj******@bsnl.in\134"\134u
…6464-HIBER-49691-GZIP-5558   kiran.***@****technology.com  3d\134"kiran.***@****technology.co
…6464-HIBER-49691-GZIP-5671   sur*******1@gmail.com         3d\134"sur*******1@gmail.com\134"\
...
135 out of 5700 email addresses are invisible to existing tools.







Cleartext 358 -- 5341 --
All Comp -- 9 -- 135
GZIP 50 14 36
HIBER 39 7 32
HIBER-GZIP 23 23
PDF 88 1 87
ZIP 28 7 21
ZIP-PDF 18 18
We ran bulk_extractor and identify_filenames.py on drive 
IN10-0138 and examined the email encodings:
68
Many of these email addresses are significant
Example email addresses (sanitized)
Questions:
• How common are compressed email addresses in unallocated space?
• Is this technique worth the effort?
69
Encoding  Email Address (*Sanitized)        Note
========  ==========================        ====
GZIP      ****@*****.dk                     PII
ZIP       ******@desktopsidebar.com         PII
HIBER     ntIV@std.do                       false positive
ZIP       ****************@digital.com      source code?
ZIP       pcg@goof.com                      ECGS Compiler
ZIP       andrew@northwindtraders.com       MS Office Sample
ZIP       ActiveSh@eet.Na                   false positive
GZIP      linux-ntfs-dev@lists.sourceforge.net  mailing list
The Real Data Corpus (60TB)
• Disks, camera cards, & cell phones purchased on the secondary market.
• Most contain data from previous users.
• Mostly acquire outside the US:
—Canada, China, England, Germany, France, 
India, Israel, Japan, Pakistan, Palestine, etc.
• Thousands of devices (HDs, CDs, DVDs, flash, etc.)
Mobile Phone Application Corpus 
• Android Applications; Mobile Malware; etc.
The problems we encounter obtaining, curating and exploiting this data 
mirror those of national organizations
—Garfinkel, Farrell, Roussev and Dinolt, Bringing Science to Digital Forensics with 
Standardized Forensic Corpora, DFRWS 2009. BEST PAPER AWARD.
—http://digitalcorpora.org/ 
70
We do science with “real data.”





























We analysis 1,646 disk images that had intact file systems. 
Many email addresses existed only encoded, in non-files.
71
Some drives had more than 10,000 compressed email addrs.
Coding                                 Drives    Emails   avg     max     σ
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1) Plain in files                         739    81,920   110   4,206   253
2) Comp in files                          355    19,711    55   5,454   388
3) Plain in non-files                     860 1,956,059 2,274 178,073 9,248
4) Comp in non-files                      474   165,481   349  59,376 2,889
          BASE64 Comp                      54       219     4      50     7
          BASE64-GZIP Comp                  2        64    32      37     5
          GZIP Comp                       234    66,195   282   9,103   981
          GZIP-BASE64 Comp                  7        44     6      11     3
          GZIP-GZIP Comp                   15    12,663   844  11,845 2,944
          GZIP-GZIP-BASE64 Comp             2        38    19      30    11
          GZIP-GZIP-GZIP Comp               4        58    14      38    14
          GZIP-GZIP-ZIP Comp                1        12    12      12     0
        GZIP-PDF Comp                     5        38     7      30    11
          GZIP-ZIP Comp                     6        49     8      30     9
          HIBER Comp                       79     1,433    18     217    44
          PDF Comp                        162     2,352    14     238    31
          ZIP Comp                        388    85,252   219  59,369 3,025
          ZIP-BASE64 Comp                   5        30     6      13     5
          ZIP-BASE64-GZIP Comp              2        65    32      38     5
         ZIP-GZIP Comp                    14       261    18     132    34
         ZIP-PDF Comp                     26       115     4      18     4
Remember — compressed email addresses in non-files are 
ignored by today’s forensic tools.
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a097 83a1 ed96 26a6 3c69 3d0f 750a 2399  ......&.<i=.u.#.
a2b5 bea7 692f 5847 a38a dd53 082c add5  ....i/XG...S.,..
5061 b64c 721d 864b 90b6 b55f bb04 735c  Pa.Lr..K..._..s\
9448 6730 5453 df64 813e b603 5795 2242  .Hg0TS.d.>..W."B
e9c8 7454 7322 7cdc b60e 97af 2f64 2728  ..tTs"|...../d'(
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a9e9 e92c a3f8 6e46 0530 8a88 c7a2 5d2b  ...,..nF.0....]+




e327 962d 6450 3d91 c945 3bed 97a6 a4cd  .'.-dP=..E;.....
1f8b 0800 0000 0000 0203 8b88 8c72 48ce  .............rH.
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(Compressed email in files are also ignored...)
“Digital media triage with bulk data analysis and bulk_extractor,” 
Simson L. Garfinkel, Computers and Security 32 (2013) 56-72
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computer systems, purchased at second-hand computer
stores, in open-air markets, and other venues, frequently
contain information left from their former users. As a result,
the data from used computer systems can be productively
used as a surrogate for digital media acquired during the
course of law enforcement operations. Information collected
on the secondary market in this fashion has the advantage of
being usable in research, as it does not contain law-
enforcement sensitive information, provided that sufficient
privacy controls are in place. This study further confirms
those research findings.
To gauge the age of each drive, the Date: headers in email
messages found on the disks were also extracted with
bulk_extractor. The date of each disks’ last activity was
computed by averaging the five most recent timestamps.
Visual inspection of a randomly chosen sample confirmed
that the extracted timestamps did in fact correspond to
actual times.
Email addresses present on more than a single drive were
discarded. The remaining addresses were tabulated according
to whether each email address appeared in plaintext or in
a compressed stream. There were 865 drives that contained
email addresses, of which 431 also contained timestamps.
Table 5 presents, for each year, the number of drives recov-
ered for that year, the total number of email addresses, the
number of email addresses encoded with each compression
algorithm, and the number of email addresses only present on
a single drive.
As shown, therearea significantnumberof email addresses
that can only be recovered by optimistically decompressing
forensic data, demonstrating once again that the recall
performance of forensic tools can be significantly improved
through the use of optimistic decompression.
Table 4 e Email addresses were stored in sample documents using specific applications. The documents were copied into
a disk image. The resulting image was analyzed separately with strings and grep, EnCase, and bulk_extractor. This table
shows which email addresses could be recovered.
email address Application (encoding) strings & grep EnCase BE
plain_text@textedit.com Apple TextEdit (UTF-8) ✔ ✔ ✔
plain_text_pdf@textedit.com Apple TextEdit print-to-PDF (/FlateDecode) ✔
rtf_text@textedit.com Apple TextEdit (RTF) ✔ ✔ ✔
rtf_text_pdf@textedit.com Apple TextEdit print-to-PDF (/FlateDecode) ✔
plain_utf16@textedit.com Apple TextEdit (UTF-16) ✔ ✔
plain_utf16_pdf@textedit.com Apple TextEdit print-to-PDF (/FlateDecode) ✔
pages@iwork09.com Apple Pages ‘09 ✔ ✔ ✔
pages_comment@iwork09.com Apple Pages (comment) ’09 ✔
keynote@iwork09.com Apple Keynote ’09 ✔
keynote_comment@iwork09.com Apple Keynote ’09 (comment) ✔
numbers@iwork09.com Apple Numbers ’09 ✔
numbers_comment@iwork09.com Apple Numbers ’09 (comment) ✔
user_doc@microsoftword.com Microsoft Word 2008 (Mac) (.doc file) ✔ ✔ ✔
user_doc_pdf@microsoftword.com Microsoft Word 2008 (Mac) print-to-PDF
user_docx@microsoftword.com Microsoft Word 2008 (Mac) (.docx file) ✔
user_docx_pdf@microsoftword.com Microsoft Word 2008 (Mac) print-to-PDF (.docx file)
xls_cell@microsoft_excel.com Microsoft Word 2008 (Mac) ✔ ✔ ✔
xls_comment@microsoft_excel.com Microsoft Word 2008 (Mac) ✔
xlsx_cell@microsoft_excel.com Microsoft Word 2008 (Mac) ✔
xlsx_cell_comment@microsoft_excel.com Microsoft Word 2008 (Mac) (Comment) ✔
doc_within_doc@document.com Microsoft Word 2007 (OLE .doc file within .doc) ✔ ✔ ✔
docx_within_docx@document.com Microsoft Word 2007 (OLE .doc file within .doc) ✔ ✔ ✔
ppt_within_doc@document.com Microsoft PowerPoint and Word 2007 (OLE .ppt
file within .doc)
✔ ✔ ✔
pptx_within_docx@document.com Microsoft PowerPoint and Word 2007 (OLE .pptx
file within .docx)
✔
xls_within_doc@document.com Microsoft Excel and Word 2007 (OLE .xls file
within .doc)
✔ ✔ ✔
xlsx_within_docx@document.com Microsoft Excel and Word 2007 (OLE .xlsx file
within .docx)
✔
email_in_zip@zipfile1.com text file within ZIP ✔
email_in_zip_zip@zipfile2.com ZIP’ed text file, ZIP’ed ✔
email_in_gzip@gzipfile.com text file within gzip ✔
email_in_gzip_gzip@gzipfile.com gzip’ed text file, gzip’ed ✔
Fig. 6 e An inflated stream from a PDF file created using
Apple’s TextEdit application. The original document
contained the string “plain_text_pdf@textedit.com”. Notice
that the email address is preserved in the output.
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21 out of 30 compressed email addresses in test files were ignored.
There are many sources of compressed and encoded data.
Today’s tools ignore these data when not in files.
Documents:
• Microsoft Office (.docx, .xlsx, .pptx); PDF files (text is compressed)
• Browser Cache (downloads are compressed)
Archives:
• ZIP files; GZIP (GZ) files
System Resources:
• Hibernation files & file fragments
If forensic examiners miss an email address:
• A perpetrator or an accomplice may not be identified
• Media may not be associated with a crime
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XOR
Summer 2013 Research Project
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Each summer for the past three years, NPS NCR has 
hosted interns to research digital forensics.
Previous projects:
• Summer 2011 — bulk_extractor enhancements
• Summer 2012 — National Gallery DC Scenario
Summer 2013 — XOR usage in the Real Data Corpus
• CDT Aubin Heffernan, USMA
• CDT Scott Horras, USMA
• CDT Kyle Gorak, USMA
• Ms. Carolina Zarate, Poolesville High School 
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The students analyzed bulk_extractor output.
Recall that bulk_extractor processes data and outputs feature files:
77









report.xml — log file
telephone.txt — list of phone numbers with context
telephone_histogram.txt — histogram of phone numbers









































We created another “scanner” that inverts the SBuf








































We searched for valid data that had been XOR’ed.
These kinds of data can be recognized with high reliability.
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DATA XOR(255) Windows PE header
DATA XOR(255) URL
DATA XOR(255) ZIP “Local Header”
DATA XOR(255) JPEG or Exif
We found substantial XOR’ed data.
These kinds of data can be recognized with high reliability.
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DATA XOR(255) Windows PE header
DATA XOR(255) URL
DATA XOR(255) ZIP “Local Header”





We examined anti-virus systems and found:
• Malware used XOR(255) to hide download URLs
• AV XOR’ed Malware that was put into QUARANTINE
• VirusTotal did not recognize uploaded malware that had been XORed.
XOR(255) in commercial software:
• Real Audio — to obscure Dr. Yuriy Reznik’s email address.
• Nero 7 — to hide a watermark (http://www.nero.com)
XOR(255) in Exfil’ed data:
• Fragments of a ZIP file that had been XOR’ed.
• Contents were Excel spreadsheets with names & salary data.
Both legitimate and illicit use of XOR(255) to hide data.
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XOR(255) is throughout our corpus.
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Year # URL # WinPE # ZIP #Exif
1980 4 7 0 0
1981 6 0 0 0
1985 15 0 0 0
1990 0 20 0 0
1996 2 11 0 0
1997 185 15 0 0
1998 443 126 3 0
1999 261 526 44 0
2000 252 526 12 0
2001 593 238 1 0
2002 734 234 1 0
2003 224 87 0 0
2004 1,359 427 34 0
2005 2,640 184 0 0
2006 1,934 3,840 6 0
2007 315 16,782 0 0
2008 1,376 1,973 0 0
2009 1,722 489 0 0
2010 802 468 0 0
2011 14,594 8 74 0
2013 11 1 0 0
2014 49 1 0 0
2016 10 1 0 0
2018 818 0 0 0
2019 3 0 0 0
2023 2 0 0 0
2027 346 0 0 0
2029 4 1 0 0
2030 4 2 0 0
2033 218 0 0 0
2037 14 0 0 0
2080 20 14 0 0
2081 10 2 0 0
no file 252,742 11,550 4,594 130
Total 281,712 37,533 4,769 130
Table 1: Validated XOR features by year for the analyzed drives, where the “year” is corresponds
to the modification time of the file within which each XOR-encoded feature was found. “no file”
indicates that the XOR-encoded features could not be located to a specific file. Timestamps prior to
1996 and after 2011 are likely the result of an improperly set system clock or on-disk corruption and
are reported here for completeness.
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XOR(255) was found in drives from (all) 21 countries .
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drives with drives with drives with drives with
country total drives XOR WinPE XOR URL XOR ZIP XOR exif
BANGLADESH 57 15 5 0 0
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 7 0 0 0 0
CANADA 48 8 1 0 0
CHINA 807 25 1 0 0
EGYPT 7 2 2 0 0
GERMANY 37 22 6 1 0
GHANA 19 8 1 0 0
GREECE 10 2 0 0 0
INDIA 603 185 77 13 4
ISRAEL 260 84 39 9 0
MEXICO 173 73 16 3 1
MONACO 11 6 2 0 1
NEW ZEALAND 1 0 0 0 0
PAKISTAN 81 31 2 0 0
PALESTINE, STATE OF 140 39 8 3 0
SINGAPORE 34 4 1 0 0
SWITZERLAND 2 0 0 0 0
THAILAND 17 9 1 2 1
TURKEY 10 6 2 0 0
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 87 62 7 19 0
Total 2,411 581 171 50 7
Table 2: Incidence of drives with Validated XOR features, by country
McAfee Risk Google OK Google Malware Total
High Risk 1,938 143 2,081
Medium Risk 1,301 9 1,310
Minimal Risk 24,090 6 24,096
Unverified 2,216 5 2,221
Total 29,545 163 29,708
Table 3: Cross tabulation of how the 30,684 URLs were classified by Google’s Safe Browsing API and
McAfee’s Real-Time Threats database.
test image Size without XOR with XOR D
nps-2009-domexusers 40GB 522 sec 799 sec +53%
nps-2011-2tb 2TB 34,140 sec 58,147 sec +70%
Table 4: Observed processing times for bulk_extractor with and without XOR scanner.
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Solution 1 — Only use when “necessary.”
Solution 2 — Examine data before XORing
Unfortunately, our current XOR implementation significantly 
increases processing time.
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drives with drives with drives with drives with
country total drives XOR WinPE XOR URL XOR ZIP XOR exif
BANGLADESH 57 15 5 0 0
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THAILAND 17 9 1 2 1
TURKEY 10 6 2 0 0
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 87 62 7 19 0
Total 2,411 581 171 50 7
Table 2: Incidence of drives with Validated XOR features, by country
McAfee Risk Google OK Google Malware Total
High Risk 1,938 143 2,081
Medium Risk 1,301 9 1,310
Minimal Risk 24,090 6 24,096
Unverified 2,216 5 2,221
Total 29,545 163 29,708
Table 3: Cross tabulation of how the 30,684 URLs were classified by Google’s Safe Browsing API and
McAfee’s Real-Time Threats database.
test image Size without XOR with XOR D
nps-2009-domexusers 40GB 522 sec 799 sec +53%
nps-2011-2tb 2TB 34,140 sec 58,147 sec +70%
Table 4: Observed processing times for bulk_extractor with and without XOR scanner.
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In conclusion:
Encoded data in non-file space is systematically ignored. 
Important, relevant data is hidden by today’s tools.
We demonstrated the extent of the problem with:
• bulk_extractor, a high-performance stream-based feature extractor




• Real Data Corpus:
—http://digitalcorpora.org/
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...those that remain are the “invisible” email addresses.
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